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In this paper, we will investigate the popularity of marriage migration between Turkish communities in Western Europe and
emigration regions in Turkey. Our focus here is specifically on the Belgian case, namely the ‘Emirdag connection’. In Belgium, the
majority of immigrants with a Turkish background come from the region of Emirdag, in the province of Afyon. On the basis of
quantitative research methodologies, we first consider the magnitude of the phenomenon and the socio-economic situation of those
involved. Using the qualitative research techniques of participant observation and in-depth interviews, we analyze the mechanisms
in an attempt to explain marriage migration between these regions. Why do so many young people, born and raised in Western
Europe, opt for an unknown partner from a region that is largely unknown to them but which proves to be their parents', or even
grandparents', region of origin? Why does migration remain such a valuable life project for many young people in these regions of
origin, despite the real danger of many negative side effects? The popularity of marriage migration is often explained by its role in
making migration possible. However, migration theories alone cannot explain this phenomenon. Here we will argue that the
existence of a ‘culture of migration’ that binds the region of origin with the region of destination and in which ‘the family’ as an
institution is capable of building a bridge between traditional praxis, as well as the challenges linked to international migration, are
crucial for understanding the enduring popularity of marriage migration.
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Migration marriages remain an intriguing phenom-
enon in Western Europe. After the (labour) immigration
stop in 1974, family migration became the most popular
way of settling in Western Europe. Also in Belgium, the
majority of immigrants enter the country on the basis of
family migration, more specifically, on the basis of
marriage migration. Why do so many young people,⁎ Corresponding author.
1081-602X/$ - see front matter © 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.hisfam.2009.04.002born and raised in Western Europe, opt for an unknown
partner coming from a region that is largely unknown to
them but which proves to be their parents' or even
grandparents' region of origin? Why does migration
remain such a valuable life project for many young
people in these regions of origin, despite the real danger
of many negative side effects? The popularity of
marriage migration is often explained by its instrumental
role in making migration possible. However, migration
theories alone cannot explain this phenomenon. In this
paper, we will argue that the existence of a ‘culture of
1 Belgian National Institute of Statistics.
Fig. 1. Number of Turkish citizens (men and women) living in Belgium (1989–2007). Source: National Statistics: http://ecodata.mineco.fgov.be/.
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of destination and in which ‘the family’ as an institution
is capable of building a bridge between traditional
praxis, as well as the challenges linked to international
migration, are crucial for understanding the enduring
popularity of marriage migration.
Our focus here is specifically on the Belgian case,
namely the ‘Emirdag connection’. In Belgium, the ma-
jority of immigrants with a Turkish background come
from the region of Emirdag, in the province of Afyon.
Over the last 40 years, a close relationship has been
established between this emigration region and several
Turkish communities in Flanders and Brussels.
2. Turkish migration towards Belgium
Labour migration from Turkey to Belgium started
with a bilateral agreement between Turkey and Belgium
in 1962. Although a moratorium on labour immigration
was called in 1974, the Turkish population in Belgium
has continued to grow steadily. There is still an annual
inflow of around 3000 Turkish citizens a year. In 2007,
for example, 2965 Turks entered the country.
In Belgium,Moroccans and Turks make up the largest
communities of residents from outside the European
Union. In 1998, there were 79,460 Turks (7.9% of thetotal foreign population) living in Belgium. In 2000, the
number of Turkish nationals dropped to 56,172, when in
the same year, 17,282 Turks acquired Belgian nationality.
In 2003, therewere 41,336Turkish nationals. Since 2007,
the number has dropped below 40,000 (39,419 in 2007)
(Fig. 1). By 2005, themajority of people of Turkish origin
had acquired Belgian nationality.1 It is estimated that the
number of people of Turkish descent in Belgium today by
far exceeds 100,000.
The total number of non-EU citizens seems to drop,
but not the number of foreign born residents, reaching
almost 13% of the Belgian population. Of the 264,217
persons who acquired Belgian citizenship between 1999
and 2004, 34% were Moroccan, 20% were Turkish and
6% were Italian. In 2007, Turks made up 8% of all
naturalizations, while Moroccans constituted 24%. The
Turkish community is the second largest community
with regard to naturalization after Moroccan citizens,
who submit almost twice as many applications as the
Turks.
Despite the ban on labour migration in place since
1974, there are still legal openings for entering the
country on a temporary or permanent basis. Leaving
tourism aside, five main patterns of legal migration
Table 2
Percentage of women of Turkish origin from the second and ‘in-
between’ generation and who married a male marriage migrant from
Turkey (N=7406).
Migration generation of
the wife
Total
In-between
generation
Second
generation
Both partners raised in Belgium 20.3 39.9 33.3
Husband is a marriage migrant 79.7 60.1 66.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Yalçin et al. (2006).
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comers after 1974 came to Belgium on the basis of
family reunification or family formation. Family reunion
refers to the right of legally residing foreigners to bring
in their spouse, and children under the age of 18. Other
members of their family can also be allowed if certain
conditions are fulfilled. We speak about family forma-
tion when a person enters the country with the purpose
of marrying a person settled in Belgium. In this case, the
marriage takes place in Belgium. Both ways of entering
Belgium are also called chain migration.
Chain migration is one of the legal ways of entering
the country and of obtaining a long-term residence
permit. If chain migration concerns the reunion of
(future) spouses, we refer to it as marriage migration.
Contrary to expectations, the tendency within Turkish
communities in Belgium to marry someone who grew up
in the country of origin has remained (Lesthaeghe,
1997). However, the pattern of Turkish chain migration
towards Flanders has gradually changed and nowadays it
is equally male–female. Population data show that from
January 1, 2001 until April 15, 2005, 46% of the Turkish
newcomers who entered Belgium on the basis of
marriage were women (Deschamps, 2005). Initially,
chain migration applied exclusively to women and
children who joined their husbands/fathers who were
already in Belgium as gastarbeiter (guest workers).
Before 1974 economic migration was male, chain migra-
tion was female. In general, men chose to immigrate,
while women and children merely followed their hus-
bands or fathers. This pattern slowly changed as the
second generation grew up in Western Europe and
started to marry.
Over the last decade, chain migration became the
most popular way of entering Belgium; in other words,
the majority of newcomers arrived in Belgium as (future)
spouses of Belgian residents. This certainly applies to
Turkish migration. Particular to the Turkish residents inTable 1
Percentage of men of Turkish origin from the second and ‘in-between’
generation and who married a female marriage migrant from Turkey
(N=7406).
Migration generation of
the husband
Total
In-between
generation
Second
generation
Both partners raised in Belgium 26.6 39.4 35.3
Wife is a marriage migrant 73.3 60.6 64.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Yalçin, Lodewyckx, Mareynissen, and Van Caudenberg
(2006).Belgium, including the second generation, is that the
majority still marry a person who grew up in Turkey.
3. Turkish marriage migration in Belgium/Flanders
in numbers
To get an idea of the huge scale of Turkish marriage
migration and the socio-economic status of those
involved, we can rely on three data sets: the first is
from the National Register of Belgium, the second from
the Emirdag marriage register, and the third from the
Crossroad Bank of Social Security.
Contrary to expectations, the tendency within
Turkish (and also Moroccan) communities in Belgium
to marry someone who grew up in the country of origin
has remained. For this, we rely on data from the
National Register of Belgium. The data set consists of
all married couples or couples living together in
Flanders on January 1, 2004, and in which one of the
partners has held Turkish nationality at some point. The
data set contains19,251 couples.
Table 1 shows the marriage pattern of Turkish men
raised in Belgium. Here we note that nearly three
quarters of men from the ‘in-between’2 generation and
60% of men from the second generation3 marry a
partner from Turkey.
As we can see in Table 2, the percentage of women
marrying a partner from Turkey is even higher: nearly
80% of the women who arrived between the age of 7 and
18 years in Belgium, the so-called ‘in-between’
generation (in-between the first and second generation4)
versus 60% of the second generation.2 People who arrived between the age of 7 and 18 years in Belgium
as children of first generation labour migrants.
3 People who were born in Belgium to first generation labour
migrants or who arrived before the age of 7 years old as children of
first generation labour migrants.
4 A generation of people who followed schooling in Belgium at a
later age than the people of the second generation.
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both men and women of the second generation are
married to a partner who lived in Turkey until marriage.
In other words, six in ten young people with a Turkish
background who are raised in Flanders opt for a partner
who lives in the country where their parents or grand-
parents came from.
A study by Reniers (1997) shows that Turkish
migrants mainly originate from a cluster of central
Anatolian provinces. According to data on migrants
from the State Institute of Statistics in Ankara, the three
provinces that provided the most Turkish immigrants are
Afyon, Eskisehir and Kayseri. Almost one-third of
Turkish immigrants in Belgium originate from Afyon, in
particular Emirdag (Reniers, 1997). This district con-
sists of about 70 villages, of which the town Emirdag
(around 20,000 inhabitants) is the administrative centre.
This town is situated in a poor, arid area that is greatly
affected by emigration.
The region of Emirdag – being the most important
Turkish emigration region for Belgium – is an important
location for understanding the dynamics of marriage
migration. As can be expected, a lot of young people
leave Emirdag and head to Western Europe as marriage
migrants. A data set from the marriage register in
Emirdag/Turkey – containing data about the wedding,
the birthplace of the partners, their nationality, age, the
civil status of both partners before the wedding and the
place of residence after – gives us more accurate infor-
mation on this issue. For the period of January 2004–
June 2005, we found that the majority (57%) of the
couples who marry emigrate to Western Europe (see
Table 3). The majority of these migration marriages are
contracted within the summer, the period when West
European Turks are visiting their region of origin.
Having an idea about the size of Turkish marriage
migration towards Flanders, a third data set gives us
some indications on the socio-economic position of the
people involved in a migration marriage in Belgium.
Taken from the Crossroad Bank of Social Security, this
data set consists of non-Belgians who have not pre-
viously lived in Belgium and who moved to BelgiumTable 3
Number and percentage of couples married in 2004–2005 in Emirdag
and who have made arrangements to emigrate.
Number Percentage
Both partners stay in Turkey 212 43.4
Couple has made official
arrangements to emigrate
276 56.6
Total 488 100.0
Source: Emirdag marriage register, own calculations.where their partner (of foreign or Belgian nationality)
was resident. This is used as a proxy for ‘marriage
migration’. The data gathered for 2001, 2001 and 2003
(analyzed with SAS version 9.1 for Windows) consist of
8942, 9579 and 11,333 couples respectively. These data
allow us to sketch the socio-economic profile of the
immigrants and of their partners in Belgium. Privacy
regulations prevented information on the specific nation-
alities; instead migrants had to be grouped in nationality
clusters. The largest group of immigrants who entered the
country with the purpose of settling with a person resi-
dent in Belgium were citizens of the larger Mediterranean
region and the Arab world (Heyse, Pauwels, Wets, &
Timmerman, 2006). In other words, the majority of
people within the ‘Mediterranean and the Arab world’
cluster come from Morocco or Turkey. One of the rele-
vant observations deriving from this data set is that in
Belgium, one in three people who marry someone from
the southern or eastern rim of the Mediterranean is un-
employed, compared to one in ten in the general popu-
lation. This data makes us confident to conclude that the
socio-economic situation of the Turkish community in
Belgium into which Turkish marriage migrants marry is
rather problematic.
Turkish marriage migration remains popular in
Belgium. One of the evolving questions then is: why
does marrying a partner from a largely unknown country
where one's parents or grandparents happen to come
from remains so attractive? Likewise, why do so many
young people in Emirdag opt for a migration marriage
despite all its challenges?
4. Explaining marriage migration
We have mentioned in a previous article (Timmer-
man, 2008) that several migration theories are helpful,
though not completely satisfactory, when explaining the
consistently high popularity of migration marriages
within the Turkish communities in Western Europe. Let
us briefly recapitulate the most important ones.
According to economic migration theories, it is as-
sumed that people leave their country in order to improve
their socio-economic situation (McDowell & de Haan,
1997; Wets, 2001; De Haas, 2003). In recent theories
(New Economics of Labour Migration, NELM), migra-
tion is not considered as an individual decision, but as a
decision taken by a bigger unit of people, such as
a household. The decision then is based on relative
deprivation rather than on absolute deprivation (Stark,
1991; Massey et al., 1993, 1998). There is enough evi-
dence that for Emirdagli (residents of Emirdag) the
assumed economic benefits of living in Western Europe
6 In 1989–2007, we conducted several extended field researches in
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valuable life project. People in Emirdag are convinced
that Belgian Turks have an easy life, taking into account
their spending behaviour when they are back in Emirdag.
However, there is also a lot of evidence that the socio-
economic situation of Turkish migrants in Belgium is
problematic compared with that of mainstream society
(Van Robaeys, Perrin, Levecque, & Dewilde, 2006;
Timmerman, Vanderwaeren, & Crul, 2003). On the basis
of a study mentioned above (Heyse et al., 2006), we dare
to say that Turkish marriage migrants on average marry
Belgian residents (mostly Belgian Turks) with a low
socio-economic status. On the other hand, in Turkey, the
socio-economic situation has been improving dramati-
cally, even if it is still somewhat behind that of Western
Europe. In 2007, Turkey's GNI/c ($8020, Atlas method)
was higher than that of Bulgaria ($4590) and Romania
($6150) – two EU members – and is continuing to rise
(from $3250 in 2005 to $8020 in 2007).5 Although
economic reasons remain relevant for local people in
Emirdag as a cause for emigration, the improving eco-
nomic situation in Turkey as well as the feeble economic
condition of the Turkish communities in Belgium must
be acknowledged, especially for those who enter on the
basis of marriage migration.
Several migration theories focus on the importance of
transnational networks for understanding migration pro-
cesses (Van Heelsum & van Amersfoort, 2007; Nell,
2004; Levitt, DeWind, & Vertovec, 2003; Ostergard-
Nielsen, 2003). The existence of transnational Turkish
communities is an asset that facilitates migration. It is
fascinating to see how daily life in Emirdag is closely
interwoven with that of the Turkish communities in
Belgium. The majority of families have relatives living
in Western Europe with whom they maintain close rela-
tions (Timmerman, 1999; Timmerman &Vanderheyden,
2005). Contemporary migration, including Turkish
migration, is more a process of ongoing movement and
of interactions between several locations across different
countries (Flemmen, 2008; Soysal, 2003). Many Belgian
Turks, particularly business people and pensioners,
spend considerable time in Emirdag. Transport busi-
nesses (especially air and bus companies) play on the
specific demands related to migration. This phenomenon
of transnational communities enables vibrant relations to
be kept between the migrant society and the country of
origin (Timmerman, 1999).
In the Turkish case, it is evident that nationalism,
both secular and religious, is also an important factor5 World Bank, World Development Indicators 2008, Internet access
database.when considering the strong ties between emigration
areas and the Turkish diaspora (Kandiyoti, 1991, 1995).
Overall, the commitment to Turkey remains high among
the Turkish communities in Belgium. Turkey nurtures
its relations with its expatriates, favouring all kinds of
initiatives that keep ties with the Turkish diaspora alive
(Timmerman, 1999, 2000a, 2001). Turkey's ambition to
join the EU not only stimulates Turkish identity within
Turkey but also among European Turks (Rochtus,
2008). Although the existence of transnational Turkish
communities is an asset that facilitates migration, it
cannot solely explain the high popularity of marriage
migration from Turkey.
5. A culture of migration: binding Emirdag
to Flanders
As said before, Emirdag is a small town or kasaba in
central west Anatolia, situated in the province of Afyon.
In Emirdag, everything reminds one of migration. Daily
life is closely interwoven with that of the Turkish com-
munity in Belgium.6 Although Emirdag is the Belgian
emigration region par excellence, it is not a unique case.
Several places in Turkey – mostly small provincial
towns – have developed similar kinds of emigration
flows to specific European countries or regions (Reniers,
1997).
Labour migration from Emirdag – which soon
evolved into chain migration – started in the early
sixties. It is said that the first emigrant came from
Karacalar, a village renowned for its Alevi shrines, some
10 km from the district capital of Emirdag. The
attractive stories shared by these first emigrants soon
made emigration a popular phenomenon in the whole
Emirdag region (Timmerman, 1999).
Even the material outlook of the Emirdag district is
largely influenced by the omnipresence of migration to
Europe. Compared to similar provincial towns in the large
region, Emirdag and its surrounding villages look
prosperous: new and well-kept public buildings, good
roads, nice houses and a lot of shops. Commercial
activities are especially well connected with Emirdag's
‘culture of migration’. Over the last 20 years, for example,
Emirdag has witnessed a boom in jewellery shops, which
provide the extensive gold gifts for migration marriages,
travel agencies, which offer all kinds of transport tothat region. During these stays we lived with an immigrant family
who migrated some 30 years ago to Flanders and who spent their
yearly holiday in their place of origin. We also stayed with a middle
class family that was not yet affected by migration.
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sies in Ankara, services to help the client to fulfil all the
administrative requirements for obtaining a visa, shops
providing furniture, electric household equipment that is
needed for the nice houses built in Emirdag by the
European migrants, and construction firms to build these
houses.
From their earliest years, young people become fa-
miliar with the phenomenon of migration. The majority
of real estate in Emirdag belongs to Turks living in
Europe, which means that most local tenants are depen-
dent on homeowners who live in Europe. During sum-
mer, Emirdag is a very crowded place: thousands of
European Turks spend their summer holidays in their
region of origin. These ‘Avrupali’ – ‘Europeans’ as they
are called by the local population – live in the most
luxurious houses in the Emirdag region, drive expensive
cars, organize extravagant weddings, in sum, they often
behave as ‘big spenders’. Migration, more specifically,
the lavish lifestyle and conspicuous spending (in
Turkish, the word ‘gosteric’ is used) of the Turkish
migrants who spend their summer holidays in Emirdag,
has created an image of Europe as the land of milk and
honey, a region with unlimited economic and socio-
cultural possibilities.
Yet, there are also people in Emirdag who regret this
mass emigration from an economic as well as a social
perspective. Local authorities and establishments in par-
ticular point to the downside of this ‘culture of migra-
tion’. In their view, the exodus is detrimental to local
investment and prevents young people from committing
themselves to developing the region (Timmerman &
Vanderheyden, 2005). Similarly, school directors and
teachers complain about the negative effects of the image
of the migration project as ‘the instrument of becoming
rich in a short time without any substantial effort’ on the
study motivation of youngsters. In the past, studying –
for boys as well as for girls – was seen as the means to
social mobility. The social cost is also quite apparent:
many young people return home divorced and discour-
aged after a short ‘European adventure’, and the pro-
portion of broken families among those who managed to
hold out slightly longer is high (Timmerman, 1999).
Despite all these critical remarks, a large part of the
local population wants to leave for Europe. The rosy
picture of Europe is an important element in the existing
culture of migration in Emirdag. This image of Western
Europe contrasts sharply with the very boring and even
depressing picture that young and especially educated
youngsters paint of their hometown. In Emirdag, young
people are generally dissatisfied with the socio-cultural
possibilities and with the rigid social control in thissmall town. It is a fact that for youngsters who are able
to study at the good universities in Turkey's large cities,
returning to Emirdag after they have graduated is sel-
dom an option. For those young people who are not able
to study in one of the appealing urban centres of Turkey,
emigration seems to be a good alternative (Timmerman,
1999).
From the aspirations people have of an eventual
migration project, we can discern two main areas: one
socio-economic and one socio-cultural. In general,
everyone – young and old, men and women – assumes
that emigration will improve their socio-economic pos-
sibilities. They are rather confident about this, pointing
to the spending behaviour the European Turks display
when they come to Emirdag. This socio-economic di-
mension is most pronounced among the least well-off,
for whom social and economic security in Emirdag
seems out of reach. Also for young men, the aspiration of
earning a living with little effort is a major motivation. In
combination with these socio-economic ambitions,
socio-cultural aspects are also often involved. In the
case of the higher skilled, ideological considerations also
come into play. The latter perceive their native society as
too restrictive, both politically and socially, and they
assume that such restrictions are non-existent in the ‘Free
West’. Among women, we witness a lot of admiration for
the western health system. They are fascinated by the
high quality health care in Western Europe that seems to
be within the reach of ordinary people. Not only young
people see emigration as a relevant project, parents also
dream of making their children emigrate to Europe. The
socio-economic security for their children in combina-
tion with easier access to the West for them are the most
appealing elements (Timmerman,1999).
In other words, in Emirdag, migration is always an
option that is present when people are making plans for
the future. Migration has in a sense become ‘a habit’, a
project in which people often engage because ‘everyone
is emigrating’.
This idea of ‘migration as a habit’ becomes even more
salient when we refer to a previous study which
examined attitudes and expectations of aspirant emi-
grants (Timmerman & Vanderheyden, 2005). We found
that while many are eager to emigrate toWestern Europe,
few have any concrete idea of the life that awaits them
there. The prospective newcomers have no specific con-
ception of Belgium, and even less of Flanders (Timmer-
man, 2006). They only have an image of ‘Europe’, which
is shaped by migrants who return home for their summer
holidays.We found that the negative information coming
from migrants who already live in Europe is often ig-
nored or even denied. Prospective immigrants appeared
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worries would be resolved. Obstacles such as learning a
foreign language, non-recognition of academic degrees,
irrelevant work experience and a hostile society are, on
the whole, taken lightly. In fact, few gave these obstacles
any serious consideration at all (Timmerman & Vander-
heyden, 2005).
In Emirdag, it is evident that we can speak of the
existence of a ‘culture of migration’. The positive image
that is created ofWestern Europe as well as the ‘tradition’
of migration towards Western Europe have an important
appeal to people who are dreaming of improving their
socio-economic or socio-cultural position. It is also
clear that the substantial emigration from Emirdag has
several effects – positive and negative – on daily life in
Emirdag.
Although our research focused mainly on Emirdag,
we also conducted field research in Sivas, another im-
portant emigration region for Belgium. Sivas is a town in
central eastern Turkey with 400,000 inhabitants and the
capital of the Sivas province. With a severe continental
climate, the summers are very warm and dry and the
winters very cold (temperatures of −30° are common)
with heavy snowfall. The winter can last for five months.
Although it is a rather large city, there is little industry.
Most people are employed in the service sector. In Sivas,
we stayed with a middle-class family which had several
relatives living in Belgium. Our findings there were in
line with those in Emirdag (Timmerman & Vanderhey-
den, 2005).
Turkish communities in Flanders exist because of
immigration. The communities from the Emirdag region
are best represented in Brussels, Ghent and Berchem
(Antwerp); those from Sivas can be found in the city of
Antwerp and in small towns in the province of Antwerp.
It is important to notice that regional belonging is still a
main factor in shaping social networks in which goods
and services – including marriages – are exchanged
(Timmerman, 1999). Migration as such is still a consti-
tutive element within community life: the eventual im-
migration of relatives, friends and/or acquaintances is the
topic of many conversations. The specific socio-cultural
praxis of Turkish migrants within Flanders/Belgium,
however, has already been well described (Lesthaeghe,
1997; Timmerman, 1999; Van Craen, Vancluysen, &
Ackaert, 2007). Here we simply want to draw attention
to the central place migration still occupies within the
day to day socio-cultural praxis of these communities.
Language, religion, social networks, family relations and
ethnic identities are still extensively inspired by their
regions of emigration. Not only by means of the memory
of the ‘authentic’ places of origin, but also because of theongoing migration and very dense communication
between the Turkish communities in Flanders/Belgium
and the regions of origin.
6. Marriage and the making of a ‘culture
of migration’
As stated before, family migration – or more
specifically, marriage migration – is the most popular
emigration regime in Emirdag and has been for several
decades. We put forward the hypothesis that unravelling
the ‘culture of migration’ is crucial for understanding the
dynamics of marriage migration and that the specific
characteristics of ‘family’ and ‘marriage’ within the
socio-cultural praxis of these Turkish communities – in
both origin and destination regions – are vital to explain
the success and centrality of marriage migrations within
contemporary Turkish communities in Western Europe.
As Bailey and Boyle (2004a,b) state, it is necessary to
theorize more about the concept of the family in order to
understand ‘family migration’.
In the local culture of Emirdag, as elsewhere in
Turkey, marriage is one of the key social institutions. We
know that in recent years half of the marriages contracted
in Emirdag were migration marriages (see above).
Therefore, we assume that the institution of marriage
has been influenced significantly by this phenomenon. It
will be demonstrated that migration opportunities have a
major impact on changing conceptions of ‘family’ and
‘marriage’ not only within the local praxis in Emirdag
but also within the Turkish communities in Western
Europe. This implies that also within the local ‘culture of
migration’ of Emirdag and the Turkish communities in
Western Europe, marriage plays a crucial role. It will
equally be made clear that the traditional praxis of
‘marriage’ within (semi)-rural Turkish communities fits
well within contemporary migration aspirations.
For the collection of our data, we relied on a quali-
tative research methodology based on a focus group
discussion and semi-structured interviews. A total of
eighty four (84) people were interviewed – 64 respon-
dents in Emirdag (43 young single persons and 21
mothers of married children) and 20 respondents in
Flanders. The fieldwork in Emirdag was conducted in
June 2005. The respondents in Emirdag were either
unmarried men/women older than 18 years or mothers
whose children had emigrated through marriage. The
fieldwork in Flanders was carried out between Septem-
ber 2004 and May 2005. Respondents were selected
based on three profiles: (1) Unmarried men and women
of Turkish descent and born or raised in Belgium, of
19 years or older, (2) People of Turkish descent born or
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(3) Marriage migrants from Turkey.
6.1. Changing marriage in a ‘culture of migration’
Community life in rural and semi-rural areas in Turkey,
taking into account the different gender roles and the
impact of education, nationalism, religion and moder-
nization, is extensively described in several ethnographies
(Stirling, 1965; Delaney, 1991; Timmerman, 1999;
Meeker, 1994).
Turkey is a patriarchal society with a clear segrega-
tion between the world of men and of women. Local
Islam is seen as legitimizing the existing gender roles
and family values. Marriage is primarily an alliance
between two families. By consequence, the parents are
the main actors in the arrangement of the marriage.
Traditionally, the bride leaves her family to join the
family of her husband. She is incorporated into the
family of her husband who now becomes responsible for
her and her conduct. The spouses are expected to fulfil
the tasks related to their gender role and to assure the
continuity of the family. Men must maintain their family
and represent them in the public space. Women are in
charge of the household and the children. They are
responsible for giving birth to a male heir. Namus
(mostly translated as sexual honour) is a central concept
for understanding traditional family values. Women and
girls are the object of namus, but men are responsible
for it. A family with namus is a family where the women
behave according to the expected social code, especially
in reference to sexuality. Girls enter marriage as a virgin,
girls and women only interact in a familiar way with
men that are excluded as potential sexual partners (i.e.
family members); if women enter the ‘outside’ world
they have to behave as modestly as possible, preferably
wearing a headscarf, and behaving so as to avoid any
doubt concerning their chaste behaviour (see also:
Delaney, 1991).
Let us examine in more detail ‘marriage’ in Emirdag's
‘culture ofmigration’ andwithin the Turkish communities
of Flanders.
The impact of migration on marriage in the region of
Emirdag and in the Turkish communities in Belgium is
considerable. This influence is noticeable at every stage
of the arrangement of a marriage, in the modalities of the
marriage, and in the changes within traditional wedding
rituals and practices.
As stated before, traditionally it is the family and not
the future spouses who negotiate the marriage arrange-
ment. During this period of negotiations, it is not re-
quired for the persons to be married to meet each other.This conception of marriage which is foremost a nego-
tiated contract between two families fits well within the
context of migration where spouses-to-be have far fewer
chances of being acquainted with each other than if they
lived within the same country, let alone the same com-
munity. From a traditional perspective, this is not con-
sidered problematic. Parents know best whom their
children should marry. However, parents have no direct
information about the personality and behaviour of the
future son/daughter-in-law when they live in another
country. On the basis of our participant observation in
Emirdag and within the Turkish communities in Belgium,
we witnessed that parents sometimes take advantage of
this situation to hide negative aspects about their children
from the future family-in-law, such as disease, drug
addiction, ‘shameful’ behaviour, or delinquency.
Traditionally, marriage negotiations and arrange-
ments are settled within a fewweeks or months, however
there is a consensus in Emirdag that migration marriages
are contracted too fast. The young people and mothers
interviewed were very negative about the rush in which
most migration marriages are arranged. Instead they
stressed the importance of getting to know each other.
Although this aspect is more associated with a ‘romantic’
marriage, also within ‘traditional’ marriage arrange-
ments, young people have the opportunity of getting to
know each other. During negotiations and preparations
for the marriage, the families together with their children
to be married visit each other regularly. On these occa-
sions, the young people can speak to each other, and go
shopping or for a walk with a chaperone. During our
fieldwork, we noticed that in the case of migration
marriages it is not unusual for there to be no more than a
few days between the decision to marry and the wedding.
Respondent: ‘The European family comes and re-
quests permission for the wedding. The next day is the
engagement. One week later the couple marries.’
That this quote is to be taken literally, Timmerman
witnessed during her early fieldwork in Emirdag. The
daughter of the family with whom Timmerman stayed
was married off within a week. It was only after they were
married – the bride was still in Emirdag waiting for her
visa and the bridegroom was already back in Belgium –
that her parents learned of their son-in-law's rather con-
troversial reputation within the community (Timmerman,
2000b). These migration marriages have to be settled
within the short time of the summer holidays of the
European Turks. Often, the local people are so enchanted
with amarriage request coming from amigrant family that
Table 4
Percentage of couples living with the parents of one of the partners
(couples married in 2000–2003) (N=2707).
Percentage of couples living with
the parents of husband or wife
Both partners raised in Belgium 26.8
Wife is a marriage migrant 59.8
Husband is a marriage migrant 15.6
Source: Yalçin et al. (2006).
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knowing their future son- or daughter-in-law.
The different stages that normally precede thewedding
are also treated differently when migration is involved.
This can partly be explained by the constraints that
Western migration policy imposes on marriage. For
example, after getting married it can take up to a year
before a groom/bride from Emirdag gets his/her visa to
Belgium. To cope with this long waiting period, people
often use the occasion of the engagement to get formally
married at the municipality. Although the small ceremony
at the town hall officially makes them man and wife, the
community still considers them to be engaged, with all the
restrictions that this implies. They continue to live with
their parents (one in Belgium, the other in Turkey) until
the day of the wedding ceremony. During our fieldwork, it
became clear that the public ritual thatmade a couple ‘man
and wife’ was not the civic wedding at the municipality,
nor the ‘Islamic’ wedding ceremony conducted by the
imam, but the wedding feast – a feast where gifts are
given to the couple, where at least some drinks are served,
where music and dance play a central role and where
representatives of both families are present – followed by
the wedding night (Timmerman, 1999, 2000b).
On the basis of our fieldwork, we found that gifts
associated with migration marriages also have a different
meaning. First of all, it is expected that when a partner
from a West European country is involved, the gifts are
much more substantial, often several times the value of
what is given in the case of local marriages. Traditionally
the bride receives gold. The amount of golden jewellery
that is given to a bride from a migration marriage has
become so large that often the bride is not able to wear all
her golden jewellery at the wedding. These gifts, or
mehr, are intended for the bride herself and have to be
separate from the ‘bride prize’. In the context of migra-
tion marriages, we observed that the outdated practice of
a ‘bride prize’ – a financial gift from the family of the
groom to the family of the bride, compensating the loss
of a daughter – has been re-introduced (Timmerman,
1999, 2000b).
Marriage migration also involves changes in tradi-
tional patterns. Traditionally, it is the bride who leaves
her family to join the family of her husband. This
principle is called virilocality. Most couples only live
with the parents of the husband for the first years after
marriage, one of the reasons may be financial. It is in
line with traditional expectations that a girl who is a
marriage migrant will move in with the groom's family
in Belgium. In that case, moving in with the parents-in-
law can also be seen as supporting and helping the girl
as a newcomer. This may prevent the newcomer fromisolating herself. Table 4 shows the percentage of
couples living with the bride or groom's parents (only
for couples who married in the period 2000–2003).
From the data, we notice that more than half of the
couples of which the wife is a marriage migrant live with
the parents of the husband (60%).
In the context of a migration marriage between a man
from Turkey and a girl from Belgium, this pattern is
reversed. The groomwill leave his family in Turkey to join
his wife in Belgium. Although we see that the majority of
these couples establish an independent household, it is
evident that the bride's parents will be geographically
much closer than the groom's parents who stay behind in
Turkey. Therefore, in the case of a youngman fromTurkey
marrying a girl who has been raised in Belgium, we can
speak of a real reversal in traditional patterns.Moreover, as
many as 16% of these couples in which the husband is a
marriage migrant live with the parents of the wife.
Those 16% of couples living with the parents of the
bride also present an unusual situation for the Turkish
communities in Belgium. This we deduce from the ob-
servation that among the couples in which both partners
are second generation (or in-between) and live with the
parents, in most of the cases (97%) they live with the
parents of the husband. This leads us to conclude that the
principle of virilocality loses most of its importance
when migration is at stake, however, among the Turkish
generations that are born in Belgium, the principle of
virilocality becomes re-established.
So it is clear from the above that migration has had a
significant impact on the institution of ‘marriage’. These
changes in wedding rituals and patterns have several
consequences that contribute to the construction of a
specific ‘culture of migration’ in both the region of
origin and destination. In turn, this makes migration
easier and more accessible which contributes to the
continuing success of marriage migration.
6.2. Perceptions of marriage migration
Being aware of the deep influence migration has on
the institution and experience of marriage within the
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investigate – on the basis of qualitative fieldwork in
Emirdag and Flanders – respondents' attitudes to migra-
tion marriages.
In Emirdag, young people associate the advantages of
marriage migration specifically with living in a modern,
democratic and prosperous country. Men are particularly
motivated to emigrate in order to improve their socio-
economic situation. They are quite sure that earning a
living will be much easier in Western Europe. While
women also share this view, they often stress the broader
advantages of living in a democratic, prosperous country
with a sound social security system: access to health care,
more social rights for women, better financial provisions
in case of sickness, unemployment, retirement and also
more socio-cultural opportunities. These findings are in
line with our previous fieldwork observations on the
gendered imaginations of living in Belgium (see above).
In other words, for young people in Emirdag, it is
actually the factors external to themarital relation as such
that are evaluated positively within migration marriages.
At the same time, they were rather sceptical about the
different attitudes, values and socio-cultural practices
which young people in Belgium are supposed to have.
They had their doubts as to whether these young Belgian
Turks were still suitable marriage partners. In general,
they are afraid that Turks in Europe have lost their
‘authentic’ Turkish culture, implying that they have
become too loose, have no respect for the elderly, like
to spendmoney, have bad taste, etc. All this is summed up
in the Turkish concept ‘kultursuz’ (without culture), that is
often used to describe European Turks. With the opposite
term ‘kulturlu’ (with culture) people refer to educated and
highly civilized people (Timmerman, 1999).
An important reason in favour of marriage migration
given by our single respondents in Belgium is that they
assume that the quality of a marriage will be better with
someone from their homeland than from their own
Turkish community in Belgium. They resort to this option
since the alternative, marriage with a partner from their
own Turkish community in Belgium, is often rejected due
to the generally bad reputation of youngsters from the
second and following generations. There is a feeling
within the Turkish community in Belgium that many
Turkish boys have gone astray and thatmanyTurkish girls
are too liberated (Timmerman, 1999, 2000a; Timmerman
& Vanderheyden, 2005).7 Hooghiemstra (2003) came to7 ‘Ethnic identity’ is defined as the feeling of belonging and
continuity in existence constituted by self-- or other-ascription and
which claims common ancestors and cultural tradition (Roosens,
1994).the same conclusion in her study conducted in the
Netherlands. Here, the so-called too-Western and deca-
dent attitude of the local Turkish youth was also cited as a
reason for preferring partners from the region of origin.
In the same vein, one can argue that Turkish parents in
Belgium are longing for more ‘authentic’ Turkish
partners for their children. They assume that the
‘homeland’ is a better place for finding such a partner.
By importing ‘authentic’ Turkish young people, they
reconnect themselves to their ‘lost homeland’. These
findings are in line with theories on ethnicity which
stress that immigrants go to great lengths in order to
reaffirm their ethnic identity in a foreign environment, in
which keeping in touch with the original homeland is an
important element (Barth, 1969, 1994; Roosens, 1998).
Several theories focus on the importance of the
construction of an ethnic identity in choosing a marriage
partner (Roosens, 1998; Smith, 1992). Young people
themselves often share these views with their parents.
For them, young people in Turkey are often nomore than
an image, leaving ample room for them to project all their
romantic and idealized visions of how a perfect spouse
must be. In our interviews we found out that young Turks
in Belgium generally preferred ‘traditional’ marriage
partners. Boys often stress the importance of their future
bride being a good, obedient housewife and mother who
should be respectful to his parents. For these reasons,
some respondents preferred very young, uneducated
girls from the countryside in Turkey. But also among
Turkish girls in Belgium we found a positive attitude
towards marriage candidates from the region of origin,
because they are assumed to be responsible husbands
who take their role of head of the household seriously.
Other mechanisms can also be relevant for explain-
ing Belgian Turkish parents' preferences for marriage
candidates for their children from their region of origin:
debts towards relatives who stayed behind in Turkey,
assurance of a ‘dependent’ daughter/son-in-law, occa-
sional financial benefits, such as a high bride prize or
dowry, or cheap labour force.
However, in our interviews, Turkish youngsters in
Belgium also had their doubts about the success of
migration marriages. There was suspicion about the
motivation of marriage immigrants from Turkey. They
were afraid that they often opted for a marriage solely
for economic reasons and with the illusion of becoming
very rich quickly. Our respondents in Belgium also
indicated that marriage immigrants are confronted with
a lot of problems: language barriers, joblessness, a
strange environment, and loss of status for the man, or
feelings of isolation for the wife. All these elements
were seen as obstacles to a harmonious marriage. Once
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remained desirable, even though one could not be
certain about his/her sincere love.
Respondent: ‘…in a migration marriage you don't
know the language. How will you communicate?
You don't know each other and you want to marry to
lead a comfortable life.”
Respondent: ‘there is a big cultural gap. The girls
there are free. They want to go to the disco. But the
men have problems with that.’
Although it contradicts the traditional patterns regard-
ing marriage, Turkish girls in Belgium see several other
advantages in marrying a man from their region of origin.
Besides the more ‘authentic’ character of the groom from
Turkey, these advantages are all linked to possibilities for
acquiring greater independence within their marriage. In
this case, it is most probable that the parents of the
bridegroom will remain in Turkey, which considerably
diminishes their ability to interfere in the young house-
hold and to control their daughter-in-law. This demon-
strates that migration marriages are also used as an
emancipatory strategy which might enhance the socio-
cultural position within the community. These findings
stress the gendered nature of migration and the different
opportunities men and women seek from it (Riano, 2005).
7. Migration marriage at the intersection between
traditions and opportunities arising fromglobalization
On the basis of our data, we are confident to say that
the concept of marriage developed within migration
marriages is central to the construction of a specific
‘culture of migration’ in and between both communities
(Emirdag and Flanders). Not only because so many
people within both communities are affected by it, but
also because it is the way par excellence to enter
Western Europe. Marriage is the key factor for turning
their ‘local culture’ into a ‘culture of migration’.
From our data, we see that marriage in the context of
migration undergoes significant changes and is ‘instru-
mentalized’. However, it seems that these adaptations
are rather pragmatic; they disappear when migration is
not at stake anymore, for example, the violation of the
principle of virilocality – grooms moving in with their
parents-in-law – remains limited to migration marriages
and disappears again within the second generation.
Also, the rush in which marriages are contracted seems
to be limited to the specific migration context.
But marriage is more than just an instrument for
migration. Indeed, classical migration theories as suchare not capable of explaining the huge popularity of
marriage migration. The most promising explanation for
grasping the dynamics that can explain the popularity of
migration marriages are found within ‘culture of
migration’ theories, in which social institutions, atti-
tudes, perceptions, and habits play a crucial role. Insight
into how a local–transnational socio-cultural praxis is
constructed is the key for understanding the ongoing
success of marriage migration. Therefore we have to
look for explanations that go beyond the ones offered by
migration theories alone.
Framing migration marriages within the established
socio-cultural traditions of the community provides for a
much needed feeling of continuity. This aspect is espe-
cially relevant for the Turkish communities within
Western Europe. Although the cultural diversity that
exists between ‘the migrant’ and the local people fades in
the context of migration, the feeling of ethnic ‘differ-
ence’ remains highly relevant. The emotional engage-
ment with ethnic identity does not diminish with time
(Epstein, 1978). In general, strong centripetal tendencies
towards cultural homogenization, intense economic
integration, and a globalization of consumption and
media go hand-in-hand with the development of new
forms of ‘provincialism’ that are often ethnically inspired
(Eriksen, 1993). Globalization and localization seem to
be two interrelated processes (Friedman, 1990).
Migrants have left their familiar background and must
become acquainted with a new environment. In an in-
secure situation, people need more structure and conse-
quently withdraw into a space where they feel safe and
confident (Lorkovic, 1993). In such a situation, people
seek what they perceive as their ‘authentic’ identity
defined by so-called ‘tradition’ and ‘culture’ and
legitimated by descent (Akbar, 1995). In other words,
they seek an ethnic identity that, according to Frederik
Barth, classifies a person in terms of his basic, most
general identity, presumptively determined by his origin
and background (Barth, 1969). Our data demonstrate
that for young people and their families living within the
Turkish communities of Flanders, these identifications
with the ‘authentic’ culture of origin play a central role in
their decision to marry a person from the region of origin.
Marriage can be seen as an instrument for migration
and also for staying connected with the ‘pristine’ culture
of origin. Thirdly, marriage is also used by young
women within Turkish communities as well as within
the region of origin as an instrument for emancipating
themselves from what they perceive as constraining
traditions. This also demonstrates that the reasons for
migration go beyond mere economic benefits (Riano,
2005). For young Turkish women in Flanders, it is
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parents will stay behind in Turkey that is perceived to
bring greater independence. But also within the region
of origin, in Emirdag, young women opt for a migration
marriage towards Belgium because they dream of a
more ‘emancipated’ lifestyle.
This brings us to conclude that the popularity of
marriage migration can only be explained by referring to
multiple frames of reference. However, it is clear that the
existence of a ‘culture of migration’ that binds the region
of origin with the region of destination and in which ‘the
family’ as an institution capable of building a bridge
between traditional praxis and the challenges linked to
international migration, is crucial for understanding the
enduring popularity of marriage migration.
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